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WORKING PAPER 29

THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF REASONABLE SUFFICIENCY: CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL IN AN ERA OF TRANSITION

by Elaine Holoboff

October 1990

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PREFACE

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Elaine Holoboff is a PhD candidate at the Department of War Studies, King's College, University of London. She is currently conducting research on Soviet arms control and disarmament policies under Gorbachev.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since Mikhail Gorbachev came to power, the Soviet Union has adopted a dramatically new approach to arms control and disarmament. Based on cooperation rather than confrontation, and non-zero sum calculations rather than zero-sum, this change in approach has contributed to a situation where both East and West now stand at the edge of radical arms reductions. The present paper examines a number of fundamental principles which have guided the Soviet approach to conventional arms control issues over that past three years.

The primary principle that has formed the foundation of the new defensive military doctrine of the Soviet Union is that of "reasonable sufficiency." The paper highlights both the practical, political, and strategic significance of this concept in the Soviet Union. The principle of reasonable sufficiency is contrasted with policies based on the goal of superiority and policies based on parity. The Soviet differentiation between quantitative and qualitative parity is also examined.

The principle of reasonable sufficiency is also supported by a number of auxiliary principles that impact on Soviet arms control and defence policies. These include the principle of asymmetry, the principle of unilateral action, the principle of reciprocity, and the principle of political means. The acceptance of each of these ideas has contributed substantially to the new Soviet approach to arms reductions.

Turning to the practice of reasonable sufficiency, the paper then explores how these concepts have been applied in three areas. First, in the December 1988 announcement of unilateral conventional reductions by the Soviet Union; second, in the unilateral restructuring of the Soviet armed forces; and third, in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations in Vienna. Finally, the "enforced unilateralism" demand of the Soviet Union as a result of the revolutions in Eastern Europe is briefly considered.

The paper seeks to demonstrate that, though it was initially an idea with little substance, the principle of reasonable sufficiency and it's corollaries have become central to Soviet thinking on arms control and disarmament. The initiative-oriented policies and active diplomacy of Soviet arms control have served to enhance the prestige of the country, while at the same time addressing fundamental domestic problems related to massive military expenditures and commitments. As they have become merged with policy, these principles demonstrate that movement towards radical arms reductions, rather than threatening the security of a state, can actually serve to enhance its strength both internationally and domestically.

CONDENSÉ

Depuis l'accession de Mikhaïl Gorbatchev au pouvoir, l'Union soviétique suit une politique radicalement nouvelle en matière de limitation des armements et de désarmement. Cette politique, qui repose sur la coopération et non sur la confrontation, et sur des calculs à somme non nulle plutôt qu'à somme nulle, a amené l'Est et l'Ouest à envisager de réduire considérablement leurs arsenaux respectifs. Le présent document met en exergue certains principes fondamentaux qui ont présidé à l'élaboration de la politique soviétique relative aux armements classiques au cours des trois dernières années.

Le principe de base de la nouvelle politique de défense de l'URSS est celui de «la suffisance raisonnable». L'auteure du document souligne l'importance pratique, politique et stratégique de ce concept pour le pays, et le met en parallèle avec les politiques basées sur la supériorité en tant qu'objectif, et sur la parité. Elle analyse également la différence que l'URSS établit entre la parité quantitative et qualitative.

Le principe de la suffisance raisonnable est à son tour basé sur un certain nombre de principes auxiliaires qui influent sur la politique soviétique en matière de limitation des armements et de désarmement. Citons notamment l'asymétrie, l'action unilatérale, la réciprocité, et les moyens politiques. La nouvelle attitude des Soviétiques découle en grande partie du fait qu'ils ont accepté ces principes.

L'auteure examine ensuite la manière dont l'URSS a appliqué le principe de la suffisance raisonnable dans trois cas : premièrement, en décembre 1988, quand elle a annoncé qu'elle réduirait unilatéralement ses forces classiques; deuxièmement, quand elle a restructuré son armée de façon unilatérale; et troisièmement, dans le cadre des négociations de Vienne sur les forces conventionnelles en Europe (FCE). Enfin, l'article analyse brièvement l'«unilatéralisme forcé» exigé de l'URSS par suite des révolutions survenues en Europe de l'Est.

En somme, l'auteure essaie de démontrer que la notion de suffisance raisonnable qui, au départ, était presque sans fondement est devenue, avec ses corrolaires, l'élément essentiel de la philosophie soviétique en matière de limitation des armements et de désarmement. En adoptant une politique et une diplomatie agissantes dans ces domaines, l'Union soviétique a pu rehausser son prestige, tout en s'attaquant à de graves problèmes intérieurs dus à ses énormes dépenses et engagements militaires. Au fur et à mesure que l'URSS intègre tous ces principes à sa politique, on se rend compte qu'un pays qui réduit sensiblement ses armements n'hypothèque pas sa sécurité, mais qu'il la renforce plutôt sur les plans national et international.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

		Page
I.	Introduction	1
II.	The Principles of Reasonable Sufficiency	3
	1. The Principle of Reasonable Sufficiency: Neither Superiority Nor Parity?	5
	2. The Paradox of the Principle of Asymmetric Responses	13
	3. The Principle of Unilateral Actions and the Principle of Reciprocity: On Cuts and Qualifiers	18
	4. The Principle of Political Means	22
III.	The Practice of Reasonable Sufficiency	24
	1. The December 1988 Announcement of Unilateral Reductions	26
	2. Unilateral Actions and Restructuring the Soviet Armed Forces	30
	3. The CFE Negotiations: Asymmetry in the Service of Parity?	35
	4. The Revolutions in Eastern Europe and 'Enforced Unilateralism'	39
IV.	Conclusion	44

THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF REASONABLE SUFFICIENCY: CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL IN AN ERA OF TRANSITION

> There are different kinds of compromises. One must be able to analyze the situation and the concrete conditions of each compromise, or each variety of compromise. One must learn to distinguish between a man who has given up his money and fire-arms to bandits so as to lessen the evil they can do...and a man who gives his money and fire-arms to bandits so as to share in the loot.[1]

I. INTRODUCTION*

Lenin's metaphor of theft and compromise is perhaps a more accurate description of the Soviet Union's present arms control and disarmament policies than even he would have been comfortable with. It is arguable that prior to 1985 and the ascendancy of President Gorbachev, arms control was largely about measuring out and dividing up the "loot" to the satisfaction of each of the parties involved. Occasionally, but not always, this involved actual arms reductions. Since 1985 we have seen the gradual building of an entirely different approach to reducing arms by the Soviet Union. This approach is still very much premised on self-interest, as in the past. However, it has been accompanied by a recognition that the massive build-up of arms, especially in Europe, has brought the Soviet Union little in the way of security. Indeed, the Soviet preponderance in some weapon systems has guaranteed its own insecurity by creating the perception of threat

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[1] V.I. Lenin, *"Left-Wing" Communism - an Infantile Disorder* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1985) p. 23. The context of this quote is Lenin's defence of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk against "left-wing" critics, which is more appropriate than ever today.

It was not unusual, during the early Gorbachev years, for Soviet writers to draw analogy's between the international and domestic pressures Lenin faced in the early years of the Revolution, and pressures facing the Soviet Union in the 1980s. For example, see V. Zhurkin, S. Karaganov, A. Kortunov, *"Vyzovy bezopasnosti-starye i novye"* ("Challenges to Security: Old and New"), *Kommunist*, 1 January 1988, p. 43.

in the West, and by bankrupting the Soviet Union's own economy. For the Soviet Union today, the process of engaging in arms control and disarmament, (whether unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral) has now become a way in which to lessen these very "evils" and finally come to terms with the now more benign "bandits" in the West.

However, if this shift in the past several years has contained compromise, it is a compromise based on principles. It is this aspect of current Soviet conventional arms control policies which the present paper addresses by examining the Soviet concept of reasonable sufficiency, the principles which support this, and the practical application of these to the conventional balance in Europe.[2] The concept of reasonable sufficiency is the primary principle that, in theory, defines the parameters of the new defensive military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact, and also the new Soviet approach to arms control and disarmament. At once both a political and military idea, it is supported by at least four other principles: the principle of asymmetric responses; the principle of unilateral actions; the principle of reciprocity; and the principle of political means.[3] Although there has been a great deal of discussion in Western literature on new Soviet concepts of security and the new defensive military doctrine, there has been little analysis of the actual

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[2] The application of the concept of reasonable sufficiency to the nuclear balance is somewhat different. For examples of work relevant to the question of nuclear sufficiency see: Sergei Vybornov, Andrei Gusenkov, Vladimir Leontiev, "Nothing Is Simple In Europe", *International Affairs* (Moscow), March 1988; Vladimir Stupishin, "Indeed, Nothing In Europe Is Simple", *International Affairs* (Moscow), May, 1988; Committee of Soviet Scientists For Peace, Against The Nuclear Threat, *Strategic Stability Under the Conditions of Radical Nuclear Arms Reductions*, (Moscow: Novosti Press, 1987); E. Klimchuk, "*Kogda byl ustanovlen paritet*?" (When was parity established?), *Argumenty i facty*, no. 13, 1989, p.3. And for Western analyses see: Stephen Shenfield, *Minimum Nuclear Deterrence: The Debate Among Soviet Civilian Analysts*, (Brown University: Center For Foreign Policy Development, 1989); Stephan Kux, "The Abolition of Nuclear Deterrence In Soviet Strategic Thought", paper prepared for BISA/ISA Conference, London, 28 March to 1 April 1989.

[3] The paper focuses on exploring those principles most directly related to arms control in Europe, rather than principles related to either broader security issues (for example, the principle of mutual security and the principle of self-determination), or more discrete principles (for example, those related to regional questions and the commitment of forces abroad).

principle of reasonable sufficiency, and little systematic exploration of the sub-principles that support this concept.

After examining these principles, the paper will explore how they have been applied in practice in three areas: Gorbachev's December 1988 announcement of unilateral reductions; the unilateral restructuring of Soviet armed forces towards a more defensive posture; and in the Conference on Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations. The main purpose of this second section will be to demonstrate that there has been an increasing trend towards the unilateral reduction and restructuring of the Soviet armed forces which is consistent with the principles of reasonable sufficiency for defence. In some cases this has included outright unilateral reductions or restructuring, whereas in other forums such as the CFE it has involved application of some of the other principles of reasonable sufficiency. A brief consideration of the very recent "enforced unilateral reductions" in Eastern Europe is also included.

II. THE PRINCIPLES OF REASONABLE SUFFICIENCY

At least one Soviet author, Vladimir Zubok, has suggested that the principle of reasonable sufficiency had its roots in the Khrushchev period. He argues that during this time Soviet policies reflected both the principle of asymmetric responses (for example, in refusing to build strategic bomber aircraft in response to developments in the United States), and the principle of flexible arms limitation, including unilateral reductions (for example, unilateral reduction of the Soviet armed forces, tactical combat aircraft, naval aircraft, and a unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests).[4]

It would be wrong to suggest, however, that the concept of reasonable sufficiency reemerged in this decade as a well thought out idea. In fact just the opposite was the case. When the phrase was first used by Gorbachev in 1985 and 1986 it had almost no

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[4] Vladimir Zubok, "The Principles of Reasonable Sufficiency In The Fifties Through Seventies", *Voennyi Vestnik*, no. 6 (36), March 1988. Zubok is at the Institute of the USA and Canada.

substance. The idea of "reasonable adequacy" was mentioned by Gorbachev in his seminal speech at the 27th Party Congress, but only as a small part of his plan for a new system of international security.[5] Despite this initial vagueness, the concept served an important function as a political signal to the West, indicating the Soviet desire to adopt a new conciliatory approach to arms control and their intention to work towards the lowering of military capabilities. It also served a domestic function in that the term itself was ambiguous enough to allow for at least a limited consensus to develop around the need to reduce and restructure the Soviet armed forces.[6]

By mid-1987 the concept of reasonable sufficiency, previously only a political idea, was given meaning as a military concept. It acquired a central place in statements on the new Warsaw Pact defensive military doctrine. The May 1987 Berlin communique of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) Political Consultative Committee stated that:

> The Warsaw Treaty member states again declare that their military doctrine is of a defensive nature, proceeds from the need to maintain a balance of

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[5] See Mikhail Gorbachev, *Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress* (Moscow: Novosti Press, 1986), p. 94. During this period the phrases reasonable sufficiency and reasonable adequacy tended to be used interchangeably. Gorbachev first used the phrase in a speech to the French Parliament on October 3, 1985. Not long after Gorbachev's statement there were calls for scientists to explore and develop the new ideas of security. For example see: A. Dobrynin, "*Za bezyadernyu mir, navstrechu XXI veku*" ("For A Nuclear-Free World, Approaching the 21st Century"), *Kommunist*, 9 June 1986.

[6] An observation by Arnold Horelick, during a joint East-West conference on conventional forces in Europe, confirms this idea of consensus. He noted that at the highest levels of generality there appeared to be a consensus about the new military doctrine and its corresponding concepts among Soviet representatives, even though upon closer examination, contradictions and problems appeared. Significantly, Horelick also identified questions about parity, asymmetry, and unilateralism as fundamental in coming to some understanding about new Soviet policies. See: Alan Sweedler and Brett Henry (eds.), *Conventional Forces In Europe*, Proceedings of a Conference held in Moscow, 4 to 6 October 1988 (San Diego: University of California, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, 1989), pp. 27-28, and pp. 34-36 for Alexei Arbatov's response to Horelick's comments.

> military forces on the lowest possible level, the expediency of reducing military potentials to the limits of sufficiency necessary for defence.[7]

At the conventional level this meant: i) reducing the threat of surprise attack; ii) reducing offensive weapons, especially from the zone of direct contact; and iii) reducing the concentration of forces and armaments down to agreed levels.[8] During this period, reference to the "principle of reasonable sufficiency" was commonplace, although discussion of the idea was often vague and contradictory.[9] It was only after this declaration of a defensive military doctrine that one began to see a more sophisticated development of the actual concept of sufficiency and a struggle to define the exact parameters of the idea.[10]

1. The Principle of Reasonable Sufficiency: Neither Superiority Nor Parity?

An understanding of the defining characteristics and significance of the principle of reasonable sufficiency can best be gained by addressing two questions. First, because sufficiency is, by definition, a relational principle one needs to understand, "sufficient for

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[7] "Communique on Conference of Warsaw Pact States' Political Consultative Committee", *Pravda*, 30 May, 1987 (2nd ed.), pp. 1-2 in *Foreign Broadcasting Information Service Daily Report: Soviet Union* (hereafter *FBIS-SU*), 1 June, 1987, p. BB12.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. BB14.

[9] See for example: "Studio 9 Program", Moscow Television Service, 4 June 1987 in *FBIS-SU*, 5 June 1987, pp. CC1-11. Several of the civilians who took part in the Berlin meetings on the new military doctrine attempt to sort out exactly what sufficiency means.

[10] The details of the ongoing debate, largely (but not exclusively) between the Soviet military and Soviet civilian experts, on the Soviet defensive military doctrine and the concept of sufficiency are beyond the scope of the present paper. These are the subject of the author's own ongoing research. For other Soviet and Western analyses of these debates the reader is referred to the following sources: Alexander Savelyev, "Debate On Warsaw Pact Military Doctrine In USSR And Socialist Pluralism", *Voennyi Vestnik*, no. 10 (40) May 1988; and R. Hyland Phillips and Jeffrey I. Sands, "Reasonable Sufficiency and Soviet Conventional Defense", *International Security*, vol. 13, no. 2, 1988.

what"? Second, one needs to ask whether the principle of reasonable sufficiency can, in theory, be distinguished from military and/or political policies based on the principles of either superiority or parity?

The answer to the first question has been the easiest to come to terms with at the theoretical, declaratory, and political levels, and the singularly most difficult question to answer in practical terms. Ostensibly the answer was contained in the May 1987 Berlin communique of the WTO Political Consultative Committee: sufficiency for defence. Thus the term "defensive sufficiency" (*oboronnaya dostatochnost*) came to be used more or less interchangeably with "reasonable sufficiency" (*razumnaya dostatochnost*) and, in the spirit of domestic compromise, an amalgamation of both terms "reasonable defensive sufficiency" (or "reasonable sufficiency for defence" *razumnaya dostatochnaya oborona*) has become the preferred usage.[11]

Sufficiency and Superiority

During the early period of conceptual development (around 1987) it was common to emphasize the fact that sufficiency not only meant having enough for defence. It also meant having enough to "repulse" or "rebuff" an adversary should an attack take place. Gorbachev's definition of military sufficiency at the time was:

> ...a structure for a state's armed forces in which these forces would be sufficient for repulsing any possible aggression but inadequate for conducting offensive action.[12]

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[11] The first term was initially preferred by military analysts because they felt the second term embodied the negative idea that current levels of forces and weapons are "unreasonable". This view was expressed more than once to the author in interviews conducted in Moscow in September 1988. The term "reliable defence" (*nadezhnaya oborona*) is also used by the Soviet military.

[12] Mikhail Gorbachev, "Realities and Guarantees for a Secure World" (Moscow: Novosti press, 1987) Gorbachev's speech to the U.N., 17 September 1987.

The Soviet military went further and stated that defensive sufficiency had to do with retaining the capacity to deal a "crushing rebuff" to an attacker.[13]

However, if defining purpose and terminology has been relatively simple, putting this into practice has not been. This has proven to be an excessively complex task involving not only assessments of types of weapon systems, but also qualitative characteristics of weapon systems and armed forces, the overall structure of armed forces, positioning of forces, operational factors and so on.[14] (Some of the complexities of this task are examined in the practical section of the paper.)

Turning to the second question outlined above, at the military level there is, in theory, absolutely no reason why a policy based on the idea of "sufficiency" cannot involve a "build-up", or a "build-down", or status quo of armed forces.[15] After all, "sufficiency for defence" can mean almost anything at all. Yet, it was quite clear that the idea of superiority contradicted the political intent of the principle.[16] One of the main

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[13] See for example: D.T. Yazov, "The Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact Is The Doctrine of the Defense of Peace and Socialism", *Pravda*, 27 July 1987, p. 5 in *FBIS-SU*, 27 July 1987, p. BB3.

[14] For an early attempt by Soviet civilian analysts to sort out some of these problems see: A. Kokoshin and V. Larionov, "*Protivostoyanie sil obshchego naznacheniya v kontekste obespecheniya strategicheskoi stabilnosti*" ("The Confrontation of Conventional Forces in the Context of Ensuring Strategic Stability", *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya* (hereafter *MEMO*), 6 June 1988; and also more recently: Andrei Kokoshin, Alexander Konovalov, Valentin Larionov, Valeri Mazing, *Problems Of Ensuring Stability With Radical Cuts In Armed Forces And Conventional Armaments In Europe*, (Moscow: Novosti Press, 1989).

[15] The Soviets are not the only ones to have encountered this question. Richard Nixon also utilized the ambiguity of the concept of sufficiency (in this case strategic sufficiency) for his own purposes. For an analysis of Nixon's concept of sufficiency see: Jerome H. Kahan, *Security In the Nuclear Age, Developing U.S. Strategic Arms Policy*, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1975), pp. 143-45 and 149-64.

[16] Lawrence Freedman has dealt extensively with the problem of defining and understanding defence in: "Strategic Defence in the Nuclear Age", *Adelphi Papers*, 224, 1987. He makes an important point which is of relevance here: "Because defence is

(continued...)

political objectives in promulgating the concept of sufficiency has been to reduce Western perceptions of a Soviet military threat, something difficult to accomplish by a build-up of forces.

By 1988 certain critical limits were placed on the notion of sufficiency. A subtle shift occurred in which the actual goal of defending or protecting the state came to be emphasized; rather than the goal of repulsing an aggressor. In addition, an emphasis on the minimum levels of weapons necessary for defence, came to replace the hypothetically threatening levels required by the idea of dealing a "crushing rebuff" to an aggressor. By 1989, the latter phrase had all but dropped out of use. For example, in terms of with conventional armaments Yazov defined defence sufficiency as:

> ...the minimum level of the military possibilities of the state (or coalition of countries), of such a composition and structure of armed forces that will facilitate reliable protection of the country and its allies, but at the same time exclude the possibility of leading major offensive operations.[17]

Finally, sufficiency started to be defined in direct opposition to the principle of "superarmament" (*sverhvooruzhennosti*)[18] or "being armed to the hilt"

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[16] (...continued)
about political objectives the adequacy of forces for 'defence' can only be judged by reference to political objectives" (p. 63). Even Serebryannikov, a conservative in the Soviet military, admitted a similar idea when he said that, "...giving priority to defensive action is a political act...". Lt. Gen. Vladimir Serebryannikov, "More on the defence doctrine dilemma", *New Times* (12), 21-27 March 1989, p. 17.

[17] Yugoslavian interview with D.T. Yazov, "We Are Not Hawks", 4 November 1988 in *FBIS-SU*, 22 November 1988, p. 74. This has been a fairly standard definition of conventional sufficiency since the idea of dealing a "crushing rebuff" dropped out of favour. In many cases, definitions still include the idea that aggression must be repelled, but with the qualifier that this must not threaten the other side. Yazov goes on to make this point in the interview.

[18] D. T. Yazov, *Oboronnoe stroitelstvo: novye podhody,* (Defensive Development: New Approaches), (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1989), p.14; and M. Moiseyev, "Soviet Military Doctrine: Realization of its Defensive Thrust", *Pravda*, 13 March 1989 (1st ed.), p. 5, in *FBIS-SU*, 13 March 1989, p. 1.

(*svrukhvouruzhenostta*),[19] thereby excluding either the pursuit of superiority or a military build-up.

But if the idea of superiority has been excluded by political (and also economic) imperatives, the case has not been so clear in distinguishing sufficiency from parity (*paritet*). In theory there is nothing that makes the idea of parity and the principle of sufficiency mutually exclusive.[20] But it is important to know, for the present purposes, whether the idea of sufficiency is simply another way of talking about the idea of parity or whether it implies something rather different. A wide spectrum of opinion exists on this subject in the Soviet Union and discussions on the issue often suffer from a lack of conceptual clarity. However, there does appear to exist a fairly clear consensus that the idea of reasonable sufficiency, at a minimum, rejects the pursuit of quantitative parity, especially if this means matching weapon system for weapon system with an adversary. Although in practice this Soviet distinction is not always easy to maintain, it is significant nonetheless.[21]

At the most radical end of the spectrum some individuals have been critical of what is called the "parity cult" in which Soviet policies became concerned with parity as

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[19] "Interview with P. Lushev in *Narodna Mladezh*" (Bulgaria), 22 February 1989 in *FBIS-SU*, 27 February 1989, p. 89.

[20] Soviet definitions of nuclear sufficiency are a case in point. Most analysts accept the idea that parity is desirable for the purposes of strategic stability, although this is most frequently understood as parity at the lowest possible levels. The same clear-cut acceptance of parity has not occurred with respect to conventional weapons or forces.

[21] The distinction between quantitative versus qualitative factors is fraught with difficulties, and Soviet discussions, supposedly about the latter, often deteriorate into arguments about who has how much, or equality of qualitative factors. For example, see Akhromeyev's comments about East-West equality of armament quality in: S. F. Akhromeyev, "The Correlation of Armed Forces in Europe and the Talks", *Pravda*, 2 March 1989 (1st ed.), p. 4, in *FBIS-SU*, 2 March 1989, p. 5.

Still the distinction holds if one understands it as simply a general shift in emphasis, rather than a strict rejection of discussions about number of weapon systems or forces. The Soviet distinction is important because an acceptance of the general idea of the importance of qualitative factors opens the door to greater flexibility in quantitative reductions.

a goal in itself, resulting in attempts to match weapon system for weapon system with the West.[22] Goldanskiy (President of the Soviet Pugwash Committee) has suggested that this "primitive approach to parity" is obsolete and wasteful. However, others caution that parity may be a "residual principle", it was hard fought after, and under the present conditions there is little to replace the idea except a shift to a more discriminating approach to parity.[23]

Igor Malashenko associates the idea of parity with misconceived ideas of national interest such as concerns about prestige and the desire to be equal.[24] He has argued that reducing reasonable sufficiency to a "new edition of the concept of parity" will not succeed in bringing security to the Soviet Union.[25] Alexei Arbatov shares this view that the concept of sufficiency must not be reduced to that of parity.[26] He goes even further and rejects the application of the term parity to the conventional balance. He argues that the concept is analytically meaningless at this level, and is artificially transferred from

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[22] Alexei Izyumov, Andrei Kortunov, "The Soviet Union In A Changing World", *International Affairs* (Moscow), August 1988, p. 50. See also the entertaining exchange on radio between Radomir Bogdanov and Kortunov about whether or not the rejection of the idea of parity is actually a new position or not: Moscow World Service ("Top Priority Program"), 4 June 1989 in *FBIS-SU*, 5 June 1989, p. 6.

[23] For an expression of these two views see: "International Program", Moscow Television Service, 11 March 1989 in *FBIS-SU*, 13 March 1989, p. 16. The comments by Major General Batenin, and G.K. Shakhnazarov (who spoke on Goldanskiy's views) reflect some of the confusion about the question of parity.

[24] Igor Malashenko, "*Interesy strany: mnimye i realnye*" ("The Interests of the Country: Imaginary and Real"), *Kommunist*, no. 13, September 1989, p. 119.

[25] Igor Malashenko, "Sufficient Reason", *New Times*, 25 to 31 July 1989, p. 17. Malashenko, formerly of the Institute of the USA and Canada and currently with the Central Committee of the CPSU, is a strong proponent of the view that sufficiency must not merely be redefined in old terms such as parity.

[26] Alexei Arbatov, "Defence Dilemmas", *New Times*, 7 to 13 February 1989, p. 20. In this article Arbatov defines two of the most difficult problems that are contained within the idea of a defensive military doctrine based on the principle of sufficiency: i) the role of counteroffensive operations in a defensive doctrine; and ii) the interrelation between military parity and sufficiency.

analysis of the strategic nuclear balance (where it does make sense to talk about parity). In his view a "sum of asymmetries" currently exists between both military alliances in Europe.[27] In many ways civilian analysts' rejection of the concept of parity have been a way to openly criticize Soviet defence policies which have allowed the Soviet military the freedom to pursue a military build-up based on the rationale of maintaining parity with an adversary.

Acceptance of Qualitative Factors

For most in the Soviet military, the idea of defensive sufficiency is associated with the necessity of maintaining an approximate or rough level of parity, based more on qualitative factors than on quantitative factors. The idea of a "rough parity" appeared to have both descriptive and prescriptive purposes when it appeared in the January 1989 WTO statement on the balance of forces in Europe.[28] However, while most military statements emphasize this idea of an "approximate parity" in one sense or another, the emphasis on qualitative factors reflects a rejection of the traditional notion of quantitative parity. This emphasis on qualitative factors was formalized at the 19th Party Conference in June 1988 as a blunt signal from the Party that the military would be subject to constraints, both for security and economic reasons.[29] In the final resolutions it was stated that:

> All defence matters should henceforth be primarily oriented towards qualitative parameters -- as regards technology and military science, and the structure of the armed forces. Our defence establishment is designed to

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[27] Sweedler and Henry, *Conventional Forces In Europe*, p. 35.

[28] *Warsaw Treaty Organization And North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Correlation of Forces in Europe* (Moscow: Novosti Press, 1989), p. 5. The idea of a "rough parity" of forces in Europe is based on the assertion that NATO has superiority in nuclear and naval forces, while the WTO maintains superiority in tanks, artillery and other categories.

[29] Moiseyev stated that the 19th Party Conference statement on qualitative parameters was finally a clear rejection of the principle that defence was protected from economic realities. Col. V. Izgarshev, "*Nakaz generalu*" (General's Mandate), *Pravda*, 12 February 1989, p. 1.

> reliably guarantee the security of the Soviet Union and its allies, and must therefore strictly abide by our defensive doctrine.[30]

Lenin's admonition of "Better less, but better" is reiterated over and over again in one form or another in the Soviet military press as a constant reminder that military development must now be based on qualitative, not quantitative factors.[31]

While there is some debate on this issue, the Soviet military has been generally quick to accept to change in emphasis to qualitative parameters. Discussions that reject the notion of parity outright are rare. For some, defining parity strictly on the basis of levels of military-technical systems is accepted as a contributing factor to arms racing behaviour and the East-West confrontation, thus a "qualitative approach to military equilibrium" is advocated.[32] However, more to the point may be the Soviet military's concern that, despite overwhelming superiority in conventional weapon systems in Europe, the lesser quality of many Soviet weapons in comparison with NATO still does not guarantee equality of capabilities (at least to the degree that a "worst-case" military analysis would demand). In this sense the Soviet military's interest in qualitative military development is also a search for higher quality weapon systems, while at the same time taking into account current economic and political realities.

Emphasis on qualitative factors has also been applied to the area of arms reductions and the concept of "qualitative disarmament". Some Soviet civilian experts trace the idea back to the 1932 World Disarmament Conference and attempts at this time to move beyond quantitative reductions to reductions based on an assessment of the

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[30] *19th All-Union Conference Of The CPSU, Documents and Materials*, Report and speeches by Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; Resolutions (Moscow: Novosti Press, 1988), p. 129.

[31] For example, see Yazov's comments to this effect: *"Vremya"*, Moscow Television Service, 23 December 1988 in *FBIS-SU*, 27 December 1988, p. 71.

[32] Col. V. Strebkov, *"Voennyu paritet vchera i segodnya"* (Military Parity Yesterday and Today), *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 3 January 1989, p. 3. Strebkov makes reference to some debate in the Soviet military on the question of parity.

characteristics and functions of weapon systems. For example, the ideas of Liddel Hart are given support, especially his advocacy of reducing military systems useful for major offensive operations (tanks, heavy artillery, and bomber aircraft).[33] Other civilians such as Konovalov have drawn up detailed models of qualitative and quantitative variables in order to compare combat capabilities, and facilitate the process of conventional arms reductions based on more qualitative parameters.[34]

From the foregoing it can be seen that the principle of reasonable sufficiency defines the parameters of the new defensive military doctrine, future military development, and arms reduction goals by setting certain limits. Sufficiency means having enough to defend, but not to threaten; it excludes the pursuit of superiority; and, at a minimum, it rejects a simple notion of quantitative parity. It is the latter especially (whether in the maintenance or development of military potentials, or in arms control and disarmament) that has laid the foundations for an acceptance of the principle of asymmetric responses, and for a growing inclination towards unilateral reductions and restructuring.

2. The Paradox of the Principle of Asymmetric Responses

The principle of asymmetric responses is closely connected to the rejection of the idea of quantitative parity, and arguments about the former follow directly on from the latter. It is useful to distinguish two distinct meanings of this idea, as it has evolved in the Soviet case: i) asymmetric responses to an adversary's defence planning (either to the deployment of a specific weapon or system, or to general trends in the defence planning of an adversary); ii) an acceptance of asymmetric reductions in armaments or

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[33] Vladislav Zubok, Andrei Kokoshin, "Opportunities Missed In 1932?", *International Affairs* (Moscow), February 1989, especially pp. 115-16.

[34] Alexander Konovalov, "The Military Objectives of Conventional Arms Control", in Robert D. Blackwill and F. Stephan Larrabee (eds.), *Conventional Arms Control And East-West Security* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989), pp. 164-85. This approach, however, is not without dangers. Attempts to assess combat potential can fairly easily slide down a slippery slope towards calculations of a quantitative type.

forces, either in the context of negotiations or unilaterally. In the latter case it will be seen that there is an inherently paradoxical quality about Soviet conceptualizations involving the idea that asymmetric responses can be utilized to establish parity with an adversary.

The idea of asymmetrical responses to an adversary's defence planning first emerged in 1985 to 1986 during the Soviet debate on how to respond to the threat of the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Soviet statements at this time were adamant that they would not respond in kind to the initiative, but would choose an effective response suiting their own defence and economic requirements.[35] The principle of asymmetric responses in arms reductions was given formal recognition with the signing of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement in 1987. One military observer commented at the time:

> The principle of asymmetrical reduction used in the treaty, is, it seems, to become universal and to be used depending on the measure of objective necessity for carrying out more significant cuts in particular classes of armaments first by one side and then by the other.[36]

Therefore, by the time it was necessary to address the question of conventional force reductions, the principle of asymmetric responses already had historical precedents.

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[35] This is developed more in: E.M. Holoboff, *The Soviet Response To Star Wars: Past, Present and Future*, (Toronto: York Centre For International and Strategic Studies, 1988), pp. 32-33. In the Soviet literature see, for example: A.A. Vasil'ev, M.I. Gerasev, A.A. Kokoshin, "*Asimmetrichnyu otvet (vozmozhnye mery protivodeistviya)*" (The Asymmetric Response: Potential Countermeasures to SDI), *SShA: Ekonomika, politika, ideologiya* (hereafter *SShA*), 2, 1987, pp. 26-35.

[36] From the comments of Col. V.N. Chernyshev on a domestic television program about the INF treaty, 23 December 1987 in: *FBIS-SU*, 28 December 1987, p. 3. Comments of this type were fairly common during this period. See also the interview with O.N. Bykov: "Viewpoint: Changes Are the Guarantee of Stability", *Izvestiya*, 29 March 1989 (morning ed.), p. 5, in *FBIS-SU*, 30 March 1989, p. 5. He makes the same type of reference to the INF treaty and argues for the necessity of moving away from a traditional "tit-for-tat" approach in negotiations.

There appears to exist a large degree of consensus among both civilians and the military that there are economic, military, and political advantages to an acceptance of the idea of asymmetric responses.[37] The consensus revolves around the argument that in the past a reactive policy (based on the pursuit of quantitative parity) contributed to an actual decrease in the security of the Soviet Union. The rejection of what are called "mirror images" (*zerkalnovo*) is supported by Yazov:

> We are moving away from "mirror" responses to the development and upgrading of the other side's weapons toward an asymmetrical but commensurate countering of threat, from quantitative approaches in defense construction toward primarily qualitative ones.[38]

And, due to existing asymmetries in the conventional balance, Yazov also argues for asymmetrical cuts on the part of both the WTO and NATO as a major step towards "nonoffensive defence" and reasonable sufficiency.

The other arguments in favour of this principle are severalfold and can be summarized as follows. First, there is an economic argument connected with the

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[37] Many of the arguments outlined below were originally laid out in two seminal articles by civilian analysts. See V.V. Zhurkin, S.A. Karaganov, and A. V. Kortunov, "*O razumnoi dostatochnosti*", (On Reasonable Sufficiency), *SShA*, no. 12, 1987, pp. 11-21; and V. Zhurkin, S. Karaganov, and A. Kortunov, "*Vyzovy bezopasnosti starye i novye*" (Challenges To Security- Old and New"), *Kommunist*, 1 January 1988, pp. 42-50. More recently, see: V. Zhurkin, S. Karaganov, and A. Kortunov, *Razumnaya dostatochnost i novoe politicheskoe myshlenie* (Reasonable Sufficiency and New Political Thinking), (Moscow: Scientific Publishing House, 1989). An article by Georgi Arbatov is also typical. He addresses a number of points raised below such as the theme of economic exhaustion, playing by the rules of the other side, and the recent acceptance of the idea of asymmetrical responses. See G. Arbatov, "*Pered vyborom...*" ("Facing A Choice..."), *Kommunist*, 5 March 1988, pp. 113-15.

[38] Interview with Yazov by a TASS correspondent 19 June 1989 in *FBIS-SU*, 19 June 1989, p. 118. See also: D. T. Yazov, *Defensive Development*, p. 10. Other military writers such as Army General Shabanov (a deputy defence minister for the defence industry) have confirmed this view of asymmetry, in this case in relation to the development of armaments which take into account economic constraints. See: V. Shabanov, "The Country's Defense: New Approaches", *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 18 August 1989 (1st ed.), pp. 1-2, in *FBIS-SU*, 21 August 1989, p. 121.

perception of threat.[39] From the Soviet perspective, one aspect of the threat from the West has been the idea that it has pursued a policy of attempting to economically exhaust the Soviet Union. This was especially the case with the former Reagan administration. This argument has been adopted fairly consistently by both Soviet civilian and military representatives and there is frequent reference to the U.S. concept of "competitive strategies".

A slightly different aspect of this threat was referred to earlier. This involves a generalized fear of superior Western technology and the implications of this for Soviet weapons development. The domestic economic crisis and Soviet technological inferiority have made it suicidal to attempt to continue matching weapon system for weapon system with the West. Thus, applying the principle of asymmetric responses is one way of extricating the country from this destructive and fruitless process. In the words of Izyumov and Kortunov:

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[39] The question of the perception of threat is actually central to the question of what is sufficient for defence, and represents another paradoxical quality about the Soviet concept of reasonable sufficiency and the principle of asymmetric responses. It is with the latter that an attempt is made to move away from a reactive military policy. However, a determination of what is sufficient is generally tied, either implicitly (as in the quote below) or explicitly, with the level of threat that faces the Soviet Union. Civilian analysts (and most of the Soviet political leadership) generally get around the question by stating directly that the level of threat has been reduced, and further that the real threat to the country now comes from economic and political disintegration.

Depending on the context, the Soviet military still tends to emphasize the existence of a threat from the West, albeit at a reduced level. However, this in itself should not be taken as evidence of a split between the Soviet military and the political leadership or civilian analysts. The Soviet military, as with most any Western military establishment, is tasked with providing for the security of the nation and taking into account worst-case scenarios. It would be a mistake to confuse the normal conservativism of any military establishment as evidence for a split, for example, between the Soviet military and the political leadership.

For examples of discussions on the issue of threat see: Zhurkin et al., "Old and New Challenges to Security", which contains a lengthy discussion; Malashenko, "The Interests of the Country", pp. 116-17; and Moiseyev, "Soviet Military Doctrine: Realization of its Defensive Thrust".

> The course towards economic exhaustion is undermined by a consistent adherence to independent activities in the military field which would, naturally, take into account the adversary's potential and is geared to attain clearly defined national goals rather than react to the moves made by the other side.[40]

A second argument in favour of the principle of asymmetric responses is based on military reasons. It is suggested that security may actually be decreased by attempting to match an adversary's capabilities because one is literally playing by the other side's "rules of the game" (an oft quoted phrase in this context). But the argument on this point is more important than simply one of national pride. It is suggested that producing weapons (or for that matter deploying forces) as a simple reaction to what an adversary is producing or deploying can result in a decrease in one's own security. This is because these actions are carried out on the adversary's terms, rather than based on an assessment of one's actual security requirements. This argument is occasionally taken one step further, suggesting that important incongruities may develop between deployed weapon systems (based on an adversary's systems) and the responding state's military strategy, to the detriment of the responding state.[41]

Finally, there is a third argument which is sometimes advanced. Adoption of the principle of asymmetric responses is seen as one way of breaking the momentum of the arms race and gaining some degree of autonomy over one's own defence policies. Alexei Arbatov, in arguing against the pursuit of parity, has stated that:

> Sufficiency presumably implies a much higher degree of independence from the strength and the steps taken by the opponent, and the intention to pursue one's own political and strategic ends and resolve one's own problems at a

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[40] Izyumov and Kortunov, "The Soviet Union In The Changing World", p. 55.

[41] There is a certain logical strength to this argument, especially if one accepts the view that procurement can be based on a multitude of domestic factors that may have little to do with actual security requirements, and thus will have even less to do with the respondent's security needs, should the respondent react in kind. The problem with this argument resides in identifying who is the initiator and who is the respondent.

practical level, naturally taking into account countervailing aims, concepts, and strength.[42]

Georgi Arbatov makes a similar argument when he says that movement away from a reactive military policy allows for more state autonomy.[43]

Most of these arguments overlap and follow on logically and consistently with the rejection of the pursuit of quantitative parity. However, there is also a paradoxical quality to the principle of asymmetric responses when it is applied to the practice of arms reductions. The paradox that is inherent in Soviet conceptualizations is that the principle of asymmetrical reductions is often supported with the stated intention of establishing "equal levels" or parity in conventional armaments. The principle of asymmetric responses is used to reduce existing asymmetries (Alexei Arbatov's "sum of asymmetries") which heretofore have been sources of instability. For example, the Soviet preponderance in tanks in Europe is a case where asymmetry works in the service of parity. (This point is examined further in the section on CFE.)

3. The Principle of Unilateral Actions and the Principle of Reciprocity: On Cuts and Qualifiers

To accept the principle of asymmetric responses however, it is not necessary to accept the principle of unilateral actions, although the two are closely related. The principle of unilateral actions is defined here as a willingness to engage in unilateral arms reductions and/or unilateral force restructuring (generally excluding increases in forces), whether or not an adversary engages in reductions, and not excluding reductions based on other means such as bilateral or multilateral negotiations.[44] So, while one might

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[42] A. Arbatov, "Defence Dilemmas", p. 20. See his comments directly preceding this quote which imply the danger of being dragged into an unwanted arms competition.

[43] G. Arbatov, "*Razoruzhenie i bezopasnost*" (Disarmament and Security), *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 31 December 1988, p. 5.

[44] The phrase "principle of unilateral actions" is used here, with this definition in mind, as a matter of convenience but is not used in the Soviet literature. In the latter (continued...)

accept the arguments in favour of responding asymmetrically to an opponent, it would still be possible to argue that arms reductions or restructuring must be carried out on a strictly bilateral or multilateral basis. This was largely the state of affairs publicly; before Gorbachev announced a unilateral reduction of Soviet armed forces and armaments in December 1988.[45]

The arguments for and against unilateral actions are not especially developed. Significantly, they revolve mostly around political issues, rather than questions directly related to military security. Support on this question tends to break down along civilian and military lines, with the military adopting a more cautious approach, qualified by the principle of reciprocity. The political leadership (party and government officials) and Gorbachev have rarely made statements directly in favour of unilateral reductions, although Soviet actions make it obvious that support exists for such reductions and for unilateral restructuring of the Soviet armed forces.

Civilian analysts arguing in favour of unilateral reductions usually advance arguments based on expediency or precedent. The argument of expediency involves the idea that bilateral or multilateral arms control is often too rigid and inefficient. What is required are measures that aim at directly reducing obvious imbalances and threatening systems, for example, the Soviet preponderance in tanks and artillery. It is argued that such reductions were carried out during the Khrushchev period with little detriment to the security of the country.[46] Unilateral reductions are especially advocated in cases

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[44] (...continued)
reference is made to unilateral restructuring, and with reductions, the more cumbersome phrase of "a flexible combination of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral methods" is used.

[45] "*Vystuplenue M.S. Gorbacheva b Organizatsii Obedunennykh*", (The Address of M.S. Gorbachev at the United Nations), *Pravda*, 8 December 1988, p. 1-2.

[46] Most of these ideas were originally set out in: Zhurkin et al., "On Reasonable Sufficiency".

where weapons are, in the words of Malashenko, "physically or morally obsolete".[47] It is often suggested that they can act as a catalyst for further cuts, for example, by creating a chain of positive feedback.[48] Unilateral defensive restructuring is also seen as possible and desirable.[49]

The Soviet military has been less enthusiastic about unilateral reductions, although it seems to have generally accepted the idea of a unilateral restructuring of the Soviet armed forces based on qualitative parameters. When unilateral actions are discussed by the military the tone is more one of rationalization and justification, than of enthusiastic support. Restructuring and reductions are justified by reference to a shift away from conceiving of security as strictly dependent on military factors, a reevaluation of the threat from the West, and the switch to qualitative parameters. Moiseyev has suggested that the concept of reasonable sufficiency includes scope for unilateral actions, and that some measures for defensive restructuring can be adopted unilaterally in order to give the armed forces a more non-offensive character.[50] This also implies that some measures may not be accomplished unilaterally.

Conservatives in the Soviet military who are opposed to unilateral actions put forward a simple argument against such ideas. To restructure forces unilaterally, much less to engage in unilateral reductions, is too give the other side "enormous military advantages". An offensive potential must be maintained, although there can be "voluntary restrictions on offensive actions".[51]

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[47] Malashenko, "The Interests of the Country", p. 118.

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 119; and Interview with V. I. Goldanskiy by S. Pestov, "The World Has Become Very Small", *Argumenty i Fakty*, No. 9, March 1989, pp. 6-7 in *FBIS-SU*, 15 March 1989, p. 107.

[49] See for example: Kokoshin et al., *Problems Of Ensuring Stability*; Alexei Arbatov, "How Much Defence Is Sufficient?", *International Affairs* (Moscow), 4, 1989.

[50] Moiseyev, "Soviet Military Doctrine", pp. 1 and 4.

[51] See: Serebryannikov "More on the defence doctrine dilemma". This is a response to Alexei Arbatov's earlier article in *New Times*.

Diplomats have also expressed some reservations about the advisability of unilateral reductions, arguing instead that bilateral and multilateral negotiations serve an important political purpose by creating confidence and establishing certain norms. Lack of verification is also seen as a problem with unilateral reductions.[52]

Despite these notes of caution it is the principle of reciprocity, and the hope for "responses in kind", that seems to have made the idea of unilateral actions acceptable in practice to skeptics. For the military, most diplomats, and those in the political leadership, reference to unilateral actions tends to be immediately qualified by the principle of reciprocity. For example, with reference to Soviet unilateral reductions, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskii stated:

> In international affairs I would say that a counteraction is essential, and we expect the actions that have been undertaken by the Soviet Union to be taken as a good example by other countries, and that they will meet appropriate movement on their part.[53]

Calls for reciprocity became especially widespread following Gorbachev's December 1988 announcement of unilateral reductions.

The principle of reciprocity is occasionally extended to the idea of defensive restructuring, either explicitly or implicitly. For example, Yazov stated in 1988 that the principle of defensive sufficiency can only be implemented on a reciprocal basis.[54] Here

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[52] This point of view was expressed to the author in an interview with a Soviet arms control expert at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow, September 1989.

[53] "International Program" 11 March 1989, p.18. Petrovskii has been a long time supporter of the necessity of reciprocity. See the classic exchange between him and Zhurkin, where Zhurkin argues in favour of unilateral reductions, and Petrovskii against. "Studio Nine Program", 30 July 1988 in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, SU/0221 A1/1-9, p. A1/6.

[54] Yugoslavian interview with Yazov, "We Are Not Hawks", p. 74.

the expectation is that the West should and will respond to Soviet initiatives by also restructuring its forces along more defensive lines.

Despite the expectation of reciprocity there is no grand theory about how or why this should come about. Ironically, the idea of unilateral reductions acting as a catalyst for parallel reductions by the West remains remarkably undeveloped in the Soviet literature, although it would seem that there is a great deal of scope for developing both theory and policy in this area.[55] It is important to note that the principle of reciprocity appears more as a matter of political expectation, rather than as a well thought out idea about how and why an adversary might respond to a policy of unilateral restructuring and reductions.

4. The Principle of Political Means

Many of the foregoing arguments are premised on an acceptance of the principle that security cannot be assured through strictly military means, thus reliance on political means must be enhanced and become the primary method of solving problems. A rejection of the pursuit of parity, acceptance of the principle of asymmetric responses, and any considerations of unilateral actions can be supported only if military means of establishing security decrease in importance. Precise levels and types of weapons become far less important if greater reliance is placed on solving problems by political methods.

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[55] There are for example, Western theories of cooperation that might be of relevance. For example: Robert Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation", *World Politics*, vol. XI (40), No. 3, April 1988. Also, much of the Soviet practice of unilateral reductions reads like a page from Charles Osgood's theory of GRIT, with its emphasis on unilateral actions and requests for reciprocity. See the chapter on GRIT in: Charles Osgood, *An Alternative to War or Surrender* (Urbana Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1962); and especially Charles Osgood, "GRIT for MBFR: A Proposal For Unfreezing Force-Level Postures in Europe", *Peace Research Reviews*, vol. VIII, no. 2, February 1979, pp. 77-92. Osgood's theory was mentioned in a positive light to the author by a Soviet civilian analyst in an interview in September 1988 in Moscow, suggesting at least some familiarity with such Western ideas.

Gorbachev first emphasized this issue at the 27th Party Congress and there has been a virtual consensus on it since that time.[56] For example, as early as January 1987, Petrovskii identified the concept of sufficiency as a political idea rather than a military one, requiring the utilization of political means to reduce military levels as low as possible.[57] Moiseyev stated that the utilization of political means is "decisive" for the prevention of war today.[58] Yazov has also argued against retaining ideas about the "self-sufficiency" (*samodovleyushchii*) of military force as a method of safeguarding security because it weakens other methods such as political means.[59]

The emphasis on political means derives from the principle of war prevention which is also contained in the 1987 WTO Berlin statement on the new defensive military doctrine.[60] What is significant for the present purposes is the view that both nuclear war and conventional war threaten destruction of such proportions that a shift must occur away from military means of security, towards political means.[61] With conventional war the increasing firepower and accuracy of newly emerging conventional technologies is

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[56] *Political Report of the 27th Party Congress*, p. 81. See the final resolution (p. 148) where it states that: "...the safeguarding of security is increasingly seen as a political problem that can be resolved only by political means." The idea of political means is also connected to the principle of mutual security and ideas about the non-use of force.

[57] V. Petrovskii, "*Bezopasnost cherez razoruzhenie*" (Security Through Disarmament), *MEMO*, 1 January 1987, p. 5. The political means he suggests in this case are arms limitation and disarmament, international legal norms, and political agreements.

[58] M. A. Moiseyev, "*S pozitsi oboronitelno doctriny*" (From the Position of the Defensive Doctrine), *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 10 February 1989, pp. 1-2.

[59] Yazov, *Defensive Development*, p. 8.

[60] "Communique on Conference of Warsaw Pact States", 30 May, 1987, p. BB12. This principle is in itself important, however, because in the Soviet literature it is most directly connected with the prevention of nuclear war, it is not addressed in detail in the present discussion.

[61] The principle of the prevention of war is often not explicitly extended to cover conventional war. However, Yazov does make the point in *Defensive Development*, p. 7.

frequently emphasized, such that conventional war may approach nuclear war in its devastation.[62] An economic argument is also sometimes advanced, which admits the negative effect of massive military expenditures on the domestic economy, but in the present context this occurs less frequently than the security argument.[63]

It is important to note that it is the principle of political means, and to some extent the principle of reciprocity, that potentially make the practice of reasonable sufficiency one of engagement rather than isolationism. It would seem that these ideas involve, at a minimum, a commitment to pursue political dialogue in order to decrease the likelihood of conflict and the threat of war. At a more active level, the principle of political means specifies that methods such as international dialogue and diplomacy, international agreements, and negotiated reductions can all serve to diminish threat, avert conflict and prevent war. This is significant because there is a potential argument that policies based on the principle of reasonable sufficiency (especially its sub-principles of asymmetric responses and unilateral actions) are essentially isolationist, allowing a state to withdraw into itself by defining its own narrow security interests without reference to the broader international context. At this time this is clearly not the case with the Soviet Union.

III. THE PRACTICE OF REASONABLE SUFFICIENCY

The development of the idea of reasonable sufficiency has gone through three phases since its inception. In the first phase (roughly 1985 to mid-1987) the concept was largely a political idea, useful as a term to argue in favour of or justify certain foreign and domestic policy goals that needed to be carried out for political, economic and military reasons. In this sense, the idea of reasonable sufficiency attempted to make a

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[62] On these points see: Yazov, *Defensive Development*, pp. 7-8; Yu. Lebedev, A. Podberezkin, "*Voennye doctriny i mezhdunarodnaya bezopasnost*" (Military doctrines and international security"), *Kommunist*, 13 September 1988, pp. 110-11, 114-15.

[63] For example: Lebedev and Podberezkin, "Military doctrines", p. 111.

virtue out of necessity. The initial vagueness of the concept proved to be a political advantage, and facilitated the development of a broad (if ill-defined) consensus about the need to restrain military programmes, and reformulate Soviet security concepts.

In the second phase (approximately mid-1987 to late 1988) further elaboration of foreign and domestic policy goals was enhanced and facilitated by an increasingly sophisticated articulation of the principles relevant to security questions. This included emphasis on the principles of asymmetric responses, unilateral actions, reciprocity, and political means. Finally, in the third phase (late 1988 to the present), the principles themselves began to explain and become part of policy and practice, so that the principle of reasonable sufficiency (and its sub-principles) became useful for both policy development and interpretation on a practical level. Thus, as Bertrand Russell has suggested, "Between ideas and practical life, as everywhere else, there is a reciprocal interaction..."[64]

The practice of reasonable sufficiency at the level of conventional forces and armaments has manifest itself in three directions since Gorbachev came to power. First, and most dramatically, there was Gorbachev's December 1988 United Nations (UN) announcement of a unilateral reduction in Soviet armed forces and armaments, including those stationed in Eastern Europe. Second, at the domestic level, unilateral restructuring of the Soviet armed forces is another demonstration of the application of the principle of reasonable sufficiency. And third, within the context of the negotiated reductions of CFE the concept of reasonable sufficiency has also been applied, primarily through an acceptance of large asymmetrical cuts intended to remove Soviet offensive systems. Added to this, there is now a type of "enforced unilateralism" taking place with Soviet acceptance of Hungarian and Czechoslovakian requests for Soviet troop withdrawals, and the inevitable withdrawal of Soviet troops from East Germany.

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[64] The quote continues, "...to ask which is cause and which is effect is as futile as the problem of the hen and the egg." Bertrand Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), p. 597.

Taken together these developments demonstrate that the principle of reasonable sufficiency (and its sub-principles) have been consistently applied, especially since the end of 1988. This trend, defined mainly by unilateral actions (internationally and domestically), but accomplished also within multilateral forums such as the CFE negotiations, involves a rejection of traditionally restrictive notions of quantitative parity. Overall this has resulted in the dramatically different approach to Soviet arms control which has been observed over the past while, for example in the acceptance of highly asymmetrical cuts in Soviet forces and armaments.

1. The December 1988 Announcement of Unilateral Reductions

On 7 December 1988, in an address to the United Nations, President Gorbachev made a dramatic announcement of substantial unilateral Soviet reductions in conventional offensive armaments and troops in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.[65] A total of 500,000 troops were to be disbanded (including 100,000 officers), and in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals (ATTU) region, 10,000 tanks, 8,500 pieces of artillery, 800 combat aircraft, bridging equipment, and assault landing (airborne) units were to be withdrawn.[66] Of the 500,000 troops, half were to come from the ATTU region. In addition, the announcement of Soviet reductions was followed by individual announcements of unilateral reductions by East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria, making the total reduction of even greater proportions.[67] To date, Soviet sources indicate

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[65] "Mikhail Gorbachev's Address To The United Nations", pp. 25-27.

[66] The breakdown of the intended Soviet withdrawals from Eastern Europe (East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary) included: 50,000 troops, 5,000 tanks (6 divisions), 300 combat aircraft, and unknown amounts of artillery. See the analysis by Andrew Duncan in: "Conventional Arms Control", *Survival*, vol. XXXI, no. 3, May/June 1989, pp. 269-73. An announcement by Shevardnadze at the beginning of the CFE talks also offered to unilaterally reduce tactical nuclear weapons in East Germany by 500 warheads (24 launchers), although in Western Europe this was largely seen as a propaganda move intended to influence the NATO decision on the follow-on to Lance.

[67] Summaries of the East European figures can be found in: A. Duncan, "Conventional Arms Control", pp. 270-273.

that approximately half of the reductions have been carried out,[68] although the recent events in Eastern Europe have, to a large extent, overridden the relevancy of the December 1988 announcement.

Before the December announcement, little overt support existed for the idea of unilateral reductions, even among civilian arms control and disarmament experts.[69] While there appeared to exist a consensus about the importance of the idea of asymmetric responses, almost all public statements indicated that any major reductions would have to take place on a reciprocal basis, and/or through negotiated processes. Many in the Soviet military vehemently denied the possibility of any unilateral reductions.[70]

Despite these reservations it is clear that a number of interest groups were involved in drafting proposals for the unilateral reduction as early as the summer of 1988. This process became a watershed in terms of movement towards an acceptance of the idea of unilateral actions. The idea of a large unilateral reduction was discussed for at least a year prior to the announcement. Proposals from different parts of the arms control bureaucracy were submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID) and ultimately to higher levels of the Party apparatus for consideration. Arms limitation experts in academic and scientific institutes, at the MID, and members of the General Staff all put forward different proposals ranging from troops cuts of 1 million, down to

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[68] See the breakdown in: N. Sautin, "*Poibut li russkie k La-Manshu*" (Will the Russians Go For the English Channel?), *Pravda*, 5 November 1989, p. 6. For a Western assessment see: Phillip Karber and Wayne Arner, "The Gorbachev Unilateral Reductions And The Restructuring Of Soviet/Warsaw Pact Forces", Testimony Before The House Armed Services Committee, 13 September 1989.

[69] For example, as mentioned earlier, the group of Zhurkin, Karaganov, and Kortunov were among the few who were the most consistent advocates of unilateral reductions publicly.

[70] This was the case almost right up until the December announcement. For example, Col. Gen. Gareyev (a prominent deputy chief of the General Staff) speaking in London in October 1988 vehemently denied any possibility of unilateral reductions. See: Michael Evans, "East's Military Posture 'Depends on NATO Deal'", *The Times* (London), 18 October 1988, p. 6.

250,000, with the final figure of 500,000 essentially reflecting a compromise figure between civilian and military proposals. There were also suggestions by some civilian analysts, for cuts in armored tank divisions of up to fifty percent, although these did not appear to be given serious consideration.[71]

The December announcement was first and foremost a political act intended to demonstrate to the West the practical application of the concept of reasonable sufficiency, and the intention to move towards more defensively structured forces.[72] In this sense, the exact structure of the proposed reductions was important. It was necessary for these be of a size and type to convey the seriousness of the new Soviet approach to security and a willingness to reduce systems perceived as posing an offensive threat to the West. For these purposes, the inclusion of large numbers of tanks, as well as bridging and assault landing equipment and units was especially important.

The political intent of the reductions were confirmed by Army General Lobov (the new chief of staff of the WTO forces) several months after the announcement:

> The socialist community countries have undertaken to reduce their armed forces because they consider it important and necessary to prove by deeds the sincerity of their intentions and their adherence to the new political thinking. They are convinced that political measures take priority in

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[71] This information comes from interviews that the author conducted with a number of the experts who constructed these proposals at IMEMO, the Institute of the USA and Canada, and also with officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 1989, Moscow.

[72] Individuals interviewed by the author stressed the idea that the reduction was in the final analysis a political decision made by the political leadership (mainly Gorbachev). Although a wide variety of interest groups contributed to the process, almost no one knew, until the final announcement, the precise nature of the reductions. Interviews, September 1989, Moscow. Even the WTO allies were not notified until one day before the announcement of its exact proportions. Andre Brie, an East German conventional arms control expert at the Institute for International Relations in Potsdam made this point to the author in an interview in East Berlin, 5 December 1989.

> preventing war today and that security can and must be built not by way of increasing arms but by reducing their numbers on a compromise basis.[73]

Lobov went on to say the principle of reasonable sufficiency had started to be realized because of the announcement.

Others also made reference to the idea of compromise. For example, Major General Lebedev stated that the U.N. speech indicated "...the first glimmers are to be seen in the world attesting that security can be ensured by reducing arms on a compromise basis."[74] However, it would appear that this idea referred not only to the Soviet Union, but also implied that the West must also be willing to engage in such "compromises". Although the announced reductions were in no way conditional on corresponding cuts from the West, not long after the announcement there were consistent and frequent calls for reciprocity. One of the clearest statements was made by the military writer Chernyshev in a TASS broadcast in English one day after Gorbachev's speech. He stated that:

> The principle of reasonable defence sufficiency must be implemented along two lines: by unilateral measures of a state in the area of military development and by joint efforts of states belonging to different military-political groups.[75]

Yazov stated that this should not only include flexibility in negotiations, but actual unilateral measures on the part of NATO.[76]

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[73] Interview with Army General V.N. Lobov. N. Sautin, "And Only the Truth Will Do", *Izvestiya*, 9 May 1989 (morning ed.) in *FBIS-SU*, 11 May 1989, p. 86.

[74] Yu. Lebedev, "Confidence Will Strengthen Security. USSR Armed Forces General Staff Representative Comments on New Soviet Peace Proposals", *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 23 December 1988 (2nd ed.), p. 5 in *FBIS-SU*, 27 December 1988, p. 2.

[75] Comments of V. Chernyshev in: *TASS*, in English, 8 December 1988 in *FBIS-SU*, 9 December 1988, p. 2.

[76] "In the Interests of Universal Security and Peace", *Izvestiya*, 28 February 1989 (morning ed.), p. 3 in *FBIS-SU*, 28 February 1989, p. 2.

There are indications however, that there was disappointment with the response from the West. Western reaction was viewed by some diplomats as "favourable" but not "constructive".[77] It had been hoped that a reciprocal response would not only include a change in atmosphere, but also greater Western movement in either the CFE negotiations (which opened three months later), or in increased flexibility on starting negotiations on military doctrine, tactical nuclear weapons, or naval forces.[78] It is possible that further unilateral reductions were being considered but NATO's response to the December announcement did not make this possible.[79]

2. Unilateral Actions and Restructuring the Soviet Armed Forces

What became apparent about the unilateral reductions announced in December 1988 is that they appeared to be even more far reaching than originally anticipated. In this context, Graham Turbiville, a senior analyst with the U.S. Soviet Army Studies Office, commented that "...as we enter a new decade, in a number of respects the Soviet armed forces that we studied and assessed in 1988 no longer exists."[80] Along with the actual reductions, a massive reorganization of the structure and function of the Soviet armed forces started to take place. Two-thirds of the Soviet and WTO divisions in Central Europe started to undergo a substantial reorganization of their structures, with one-sixth of forces actually being reduced (leaving 24 reorganized divisions in place). It

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[77] Interview with diplomat at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 1989, Moscow.

[78] Lebedev, "Confidence Will Strengthen Security", p. 2. The expectation of reciprocity in these areas was confirmed to the author a number of times in the interviews conducted in September 1989, Moscow.

[79] See especially the comments of Lushev (commander in chief of the WTO forces) where he says that further unilateral cuts are possible, and that the WTO might "have gone further if they had had more practical indications that NATO, too, is prepared to take analogous steps." Interview in Brussels with General P. Lushev: "The Warsaw Pact's Objections to Short-Range Nuclear Forces", *De Standaard*, 20 April 1989, p. 5 in *FBIS-SU*, 27 April 1989, p. 6.

[80] Graham H. Turbiville, "Restructuring the Soviet Ground Forces Reduction-Mobilization-Force Generation", *Military Review*, December 1989, p. 17.

was estimated by Western analysts that combat potential might be reduced by as much as 20-25% in Eastern Europe, and by 18% on the Central Front.[81] More significantly, operational manoeuvre groups (OMGs), which were long viewed as one of the most threatening and offensive aspects of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, appeared to have been dissolved. Of the six tank divisions disbanded because of the December announcement, five apparently belonged to the OMGs.[82]

Defensive restructuring is also taking place in other areas. Training and military exercises are said to have been revised towards a more defensive orientation.[83] The military budget is also to be reduced by 14.2% and arms production and military hardware by 19.5%.[84] Tank production has already decreased by 40%.[85]

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81 Karber and Arner, "The Gorbachev Unilateral Reductions"; "Statement of Edward L. Warner III", House Armed Services Committee, 13 September 1989, pp. 3-6. (See Warner , pp. 5-6 on the estimates of combat potential.) The main area of remaining ambiguity was with artillery. Western analysts could not seem to account for much of the artillery which was supposed to have been reduced (in contrast to tanks, almost all of which could be accounted for), and also whether or not there would be an attempt to enhance artillery strength to compensate for the reduction in combat capability. See: Warner, p. 5, and, Karber and Arner. More recently, there have been concerns expressed by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency that large supplies of fuel and ammunition continue to be maintained in Eastern Europe. Michael R. Gordon, "Soviets Still Stocking Ammunition, U.S. Says", *New York Times*, 11 January 1990, p. A15.

82 D.T. Yazov, "*TASS* Interview" 19 June 1989, p. 120; Phillip Karber, "Soviet Implementation Of The Gorbachev Unilateral Military Reductions: Implications For Conventional Arms Control In Europe", testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, 14 March 1989, p. 13.

83 See for example the interview with Col. Gen. M. Burlakov: "*S novykh usloviyakh*" (In New Conditions), *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 26 April 1989, p. 2, and Maj. Gen. I. Vorob'yev, "*Podvizhnaya, mobil'naya, manevrennaya...*" ("Mobile, active, manoeuvre..."), *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 27 September 1989, p. 2, on defense at the tactical level.

84 Yazov, "Based on Principles of Realism", p. 1.

85 "Soviet Military Budget, Military Costs And Arms Control", Hearing of the House Armed Services Committee, 21 July 1989, Testimony of Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev (Federal News Service, 1989), pp. 17-19, 21-1.

It is of interest to note that the nature of the restructuring process demonstrates that reasonable defensive sufficiency (as a military concept) can actually include increases in certain discreet systems, based on the assumption that these are acceptable if they enhance the defensive capability of the forces involved. For example, there was movement towards the replacement of tank regiments with motorized rifle regiments (with increases in infantry fighting vehicles, probably redeployed from the Soviet Union to Eastern Europe), and planned increases in mine-laying, field fortifications, anti-tank missiles and guns, and anti-aircraft capabilities.[86]

Operational Planning

It is especially at the level of operational planning that changes are required to demonstrate movement towards a defensive doctrine based on sufficiency. There has been much debate about the role of the counteroffensive in a new defensive doctrine.[87] Prior to 1989 there was continued reference to the need to carry out counteroffensive operations within the context of defensive battles.[88] While this question is by no means settled, statements by Akhromeyev have implicitly acknowledged Western anxieties on this issue. He stated that the Soviet armed forces are planning for long defensive operations, and would not launch a counterattack until after three to four weeks. The wording of his comments suggest that a counteroffensive, the aim of which would be to move the battle

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[86] On motorized rifle regiments see: Karber and Arner, "The Gorbachev Unilateral Reductions", p. 3; Statement of Warner, p. 4. And also see: Burlakov, "In New Conditions"; and interview with Army General B. Snetkov: "*V usloviyakh sokrashcheniya*" (In the Condition of the Reductions), *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 23 March 1989, p. 2.

[87] A distinction is made between counterattacks and counterstrikes which occur at the tactical level, and counteroffensives which take place at the operational level and are associated with offensive military planning.

[88] See for example, the comments of Col. Gen. S. A. Dikov in the panel discussion on Moscow television: "Restructuring and the Armed Forces", 5 December 1988 in *FBIS-SU*, 9 December 1988, p. 80. See also: Alexei Arbatov, "Reasonable Sufficiency: where does it end?", *New Times*, (17), 25 April to 1 May 1989, p. 12. He describes the question of counteroffensive operations as the "key dilemma of the defensive doctrine".

onto an opponent's territory (and probably take territory), is rejected.[89] A first deputy commander in chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany also discussed the use of counterattacks (versus counteroffensives), and withdrawal for defensive purposes.[90] And Lushev (WTO commander-in-chief) confirmed to NATO representatives that defence would be restricted to the WTO's own territory and restoring the territorial integrity of WTO members.[91] These comments by the Soviet military appear to demonstrate the rejection of the idea of a massive counterattack within the context of the Soviet defensive doctrine.

Some civilian analysts such as Alexei Arbatov argue for even more radical unilateral restructuring and reductions than those discussed above. He has suggested that the WTO could maintain an in-depth echeloned defence with one-third of its current forces (reducing down to 50-60 divisions). The Soviet forces should be entirely restructured, along with the airforce and disbanding of aging tactical aircraft. The much cherished Soviet air defence system should be radically reduced. He also argues that the Soviet Union should accept the idea of asymmetry between Soviet and U.S. naval forces, and scrap expensive plans such as building Soviet aircraft carriers to compete with the West. Soviet naval forces should focus on coastal defence, and reject interdiction roles, and search and destroy roles for submarines. His other suggestions include: reducing the military budget (for procurement); increasing the personnel and maintenance budgets (especially in areas related to combat readiness); reforming the military industry, for

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89 Pierre Darcourt, interview with Akhromeyev, *Le Figaro*, 13 June 1989 in *FBIS-SU*, 15 June 1989, p. 70.

90 Col. A. Vasilets, interview with Lt. Gen. M. Kalinin, "*Druzhba*-89" ('Friendship-89'), *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 19 March 1989, p. 2. Kalinin goes on to note that counterstrikes would not take place until the enemy had driven a wedge into the defensive zone of the Polish Army.

91 Lushev's comments to Wolfgang Altenburg are reported in: *The Arms Control Reporter* (hereafter ACR), 18 May 1989, p. 402.B.224. Of course, defending the "territorial integrity" of WTO members is of rather less significance since the revolutions in Eastern Europe.

example, reducing production plants by 50%; shifting to a professional army; and cutting the massive military bureaucracy.[92]

Other civilian analysts such as Kokoshin and his colleagues have adopted more "structural" approaches, common among Western non-offensive defence theorists. This approach is far more dependent on reciprocity from the West, requiring a great degree of cooperation between NATO and the WTO, either in negotiations or through agreement on reorganization of forces.[93]

What is most significant about the Soviet reorganization of forces that has taken place to date, as well as the plans of some civilian analysts, is the trend towards support for unilateral actions. As mentioned earlier, there were a number of statements by the Soviet military to the effect that defensive restructuring must take place on a mutual basis. However what seems apparent is that at this point in time this is much more of a hope, than a requirement. Comprehensive restructuring, urged on by domestic imperatives, is occurring apparently without the need for reciprocal measures from the

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[92] Many of his ideas are summarized in: Alexei Arbatov, "How Much Defence Is Sufficient", *International Affairs*, April 1989. The idea of a professional army, possibly alongside a territorial/militia army, to replace the current system has been an issue of growing significance. Individuals such as Yazov have argued strongly against a professional army, suggesting it would cost many times more than the present system. However others in the military support the idea and it is growing in importance, especially when nationalities questions, the decreasing popularity of the military profession, and the role of the party in the military sphere are becoming issues of greater significance. Conscription requirements have already been reduced from two years down to one year, and it seems likely that movement towards a professional, and probably largely Russian army, is inevitable.

[93] Most of this work is summarized in: Kokoshin et al., *Problems of Ensuring Stability With Radical Cuts In Armed Forces*. It is significant that much of this approach has become irrelevant in view of the recent events in Eastern Europe, especially those aspects related to disengagement, redeployment, and zones of reduced armaments. Still, many points on structural reorganization and reductions are useful.

West. Although there are as yet many uncertainties about the final outcome of this, the movement toward more defensively-oriented forces has been clear.[94]

3. The CFE Negotiations: Asymmetry In The Service Of Parity?

Despite the fact that there has been an obvious trend toward unilaterally reducing and restructuring the Soviet armed forces, arms control negotiations have remained, until now, an important method for reducing forces and armaments. The question for the present discussion is whether or not the principle of reasonable sufficiency, and its sub-principles, have been at all relevant to conventional arms control negotiations?

The Soviet approach to implementing reasonable sufficiency at the conventional level has involved considerable emphasis on the formal negotiation process in addition to the unilateral measures being carried out. This is consistent with the emphasis on political means, of which negotiations are viewed as one. The significance of arms control negotiations resides not only in what they may accomplish, but also in their utility as political measures creating confidence and mutual understanding. Negotiations and their byproducts (for example, exchange of information and verification regimes) may contribute to developing positive political relations, which in turn can contribute to security.[95]

The overall Soviet plan for conventional arms control negotiations initially envisioned a three-phase, ten-year process directed towards establishing forces at levels consistent with the idea of reasonable defensive sufficiency. During the first

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[94] "Defensively-oriented" forces do not necessarily exclude the option of conducting offensive operations (although a strategic offensive may be excluded). They only make it less likely that these will be successful, depending on the degree of restructuring and placement of forces. It is important to note that there is no magic line whereupon forces suddenly become "defensive".

[95] See for example, the comments of Gennadiy Vedenyapin: "International Diary Program", Moscow Domestic Television Service, 9 November 1989 in *FBIS-SU*, 13 November 1989, p. 1-2.

phase (CFE I), emphasis would be placed on reducing existing asymmetries, reducing the threat of surprise attack and large-scale offensive operations, and reducing overall levels by 10-15%. The second phase (CFE II) would actually focus on restructuring forces in line with the concept of reasonable sufficiency for defence, and on reducing forces and armaments an additional 25%. (Here one sees the beginning of an expectation for reciprocity in the actual restructuring of forces.) The final phase would involve further reductions and an actual coordination of any further military development so that it would remain in line with the defensive restructuring accomplished in the first two phases.[96] This plan of course, is outlined at a very general level and by now is dated by the fast pace of events in Eastern Europe. Nonetheless it demonstrates the central place that the concept of reasonable sufficiency had in the negotiation process, according to the Soviet view.[97]

To some extent, acceptance of the principles of reasonable sufficiency may have allowed Soviet representatives to adopt a more flexible approach to the CFE negotiations. Although CFE is still being conducted on the basis of quantitative parameters, there has been a less obsessive concern with "bean-counting" and a greater appreciation of the end result, both for substantive and political reasons. This has been facilitated by the CFE emphasis on finding agreement on final levels of forces and armaments, rather than engaging in endless debate over data and what levels exist before reducing. It is significant that Chernyshev identified this as the main issue distinguishing

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[96] See, for example, the interview with Col. Gen. Chervov by Col. V. Morozov: "To Build Bridges, Summing Up The First Round of Negotiations on Conventional Weapons", *Trud*, 12 April 1989, p. 3, in *FBIS-SU*, 20 April 1989, p. 1. This is largely a modernized version of the "Budapest Appeal" of June 1986 which advocated similar reductions, without the terminology of reasonable sufficiency and defensive structuring. Shevardnadze introduced the three-stage plan at the beginning of the CFE negotiations.

[97] It should be noted that NATO uses the term "sufficiency" in the CFE context, in order to place upper limits on the number of armaments retained by any one country. Sufficiency in this context is defined as no one country retaining more than 30 percent of the overall limits in main battle tanks, APCs, artillery pieces, combat aircraft, and combat helicopters. See the report on the Western position paper in *ACR*, 1989, pp. 407.D.27, 407.E.30.

CFE from the fruitless MBFR talks.[98] The CFE method moves away from an emphasis on making equal reductions, to one of asymmetrical reductions aimed at establishing final equal levels. The paradox of this situation involves the Soviet insistence (for obvious reasons of political bargaining) that, in fact a state of parity or rough equality currently exists in the conventional balance. However, because it is a parity plagued by asymmetries in different armaments and force levels, the principle of asymmetric responses can itself be used to establish parity (yet again !), albeit at significantly lower and more "equitable" levels.

Despite this utilization of the principle of asymmetric responses in the service of parity, it is the Soviet acceptance of the former idea which has played one of the most significant roles at the CFE negotiations. It has allowed for an acceptance of reductions which, under any other negotiating conditions, would have been highly unacceptable. Whatever the exact outcome of CFE the Soviet Union is already committed to accepting deep cuts in manpower, tanks, armored personnel-carriers (APCs), and artillery. A very rough approximation of these cuts based on WTO proposals and figures (in May 1989) would have committed the WTO to the following reductions (with corresponding NATO reductions in parenthesis): manpower (at a minimum) -- 640,000 (260,000); tanks -- 39,470 (10,690); APCs -- 42,330 (18,900); artillery pieces -- 47,560 (33,060).[99] For the central region the figures are even more dramatic, especially if NATO recommendations on manpower reductions are accepted, and they reflect the Soviet willingness to reduce its preponderance of forces dramatically.

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[98] V. Chernyshev, "Viennese Equation-Third Round of Talks Between Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO Countries on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Has Begun", *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 6 September 1989 (2nd ed.), p. 5, in *FBIS-SU*, 14 September 1989, p. 1.

[99] These are the author's "ballpark estimates", based on WTO figures, of what the East would have expected to have to cut early on in the negotiations.

Reciprocity at the CFE

Given the Soviet emphasis on reciprocity, especially as the price for reductions in its offensive forces, one can ask whether this principle has been operative at the CFE negotiations. While there have been a number of smaller examples of the application of this principle, the most important one came in May 1989 when President Bush agreed to the inclusion of combat aircraft and helicopters, and manpower in the CFE negotiations. This was certainly understood as a measure of reciprocity by the West, in response to the levels of reductions that the Soviet Union was prepared to make in CFE.[100] However, there are numerous indications that the Soviet Union did not anticipate the Pandora's box that the question of aircraft opened at CFE. The definition of "combat aircraft" has progressively widened, and ironically, the Soviet side could well be forced to accept deeper cuts than NATO if even a portion of its air defence fighters are included. (The latter are the main sticking point on aircraft with the Soviet Union refusing to negotiate on these forces.)[101]

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[100] On the Bush proposal see: *ACR*, 29 and 30 May 1989, pp. 407.B.175-182. There are other areas where the Soviet side obviously thought reciprocity should or could take place in negotiations. At least one rationale for the December 1988 unilateral reduction was that it would deprive NATO of one of its reasons for tactical nuclear weapons. Perhaps this is one reason that negotiations on reducing shorter-range nuclear forces (SNF) were viewed as a realistic possibility (in or outside CFE). See the interview with Victor Karpov: Dmitry Pogorzhelsky, "Vienna: after and before", *New Times*, 14-20 February 1989 (7). They also expected reciprocity in negotiations on naval forces, perhaps as the price for their withdrawal of the most offensive systems in Europe, which in the Soviet view sacrifices their strategic advantage of operational depth.

One other area where the Soviets were successful in achieving what they considered to be a measure of reciprocity in response to the December initiative was on the question of an exchange of views on military doctrine. Early in 1990 a seminar on military doctrines was held in Vienna under the rubric of the CSCE negotiations.

[101] For the WTO's latest definitions on aircraft, reported by Oleg Grinevsky, 7 September 1989, in Vienna, see: Douglas Clarke, "Air Defense Aircraft Still A Problem In Vienna", *Radio Free Europe*, Background Report/187, 12 October 1989.

Finally, and more recently, there has been another demonstration, this time rather unexpected, of the Soviet acceptance of the principle of asymmetric responses within the CFE negotiations. In February 1990, Gorbachev agreed to a proposal by Bush to reduce U.S. and Soviet troops in Central Europe to 195,000, while allowing the U.S. to maintain an extra 30,000 troops in Europe.[102] Acceptance of these figures commits the Soviet Union to a reduction of 375,000 troops, and the U.S. to a reduction of 80,000 (with overall WTO/NATO levels left unclear at present).

From the above it can be seen that the principle of reasonable sufficiency has provided a broad framework for the Soviet approach to the CFE negotiations. The prospect of asymmetrical reductions has perhaps been more palatable, and reciprocity appreciated to a greater degree, given the existence of the concept and its supporting ideas.

4. The Revolutions In Eastern Europe and "Enforced Unilateralism"

Despite the importance that the Soviet Union continues to attach to the formal negotiation process, there is much to suggest that the pace of events in Eastern Europe has only served to reinforce the already existing trends towards unilateral actions (reductions and restructuring), and ultimately may contribute to the increasing irrelevance of the conventional arms control process in Europe,[103] and even the concept of

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[102] Paul Lewis, "West and Soviets Agree With 2 Germanys On Rapid Schedule For Unification Talks; Gorbachev Accepts Bush's Troop Ceiling", *New York Times*, 14 February 1990, p. 1. It is quite possible that Gorbachev may have received something in return for his compromise, something which is as yet unknown (perhaps greater Western flexibility on the question of aircraft).

[103] There are other reasons why conventional arms control may become increasingly irrelevant after CFE. These negotiations are dealing with the elimination of approximately 120,000 individual pieces of equipment, not to mention a huge number of personnel, all of which will be subject to some of the most elaborate verification procedures ever put in place. The extraordinary technical complexity of these tasks will take a long time to come to full realization, and may thwart enthusiasm for embarking on a further conventional arms control regime in addition

(continued...)

reasonable sufficiency as it has been understood up until now. Some of these trends have already been seen in the enforced unilateralism demanded by the Hungarian and Czechoslovakian requests for Soviet troop withdrawals, and Soviet troops in East Germany will soon meet a similar fate.

On 9 February this year, the Soviet Union agreed to begin withdrawing its 73,500 troops (and equipment) in Czechoslovakia, a process to be completed by mid-1991.[104] Then on 11 March, Hungary and the Soviet Union signed an agreement on the complete withdrawal of 49,700 Soviet troops and equipment (860 tanks, 1,500 armored personnel carriers, and 27,146 combat vehicles), also by June 1991.[105] In addition, there were requests for Soviet troop withdrawals (40,000 troops) from Poland by Lech Walesa in January, although these were not repeated in the face of the failure of West Germany to provide border guarantees to Poland.[106] Now that Polish anxieties about this question have been addressed it is likely that a renewed call will be issued for Soviet troops to leave the region.[107]

Assuming the troops and equipment in Czechoslovakia and Hungary will simply be pulled eastward, remaining in the ATTU region, CFE will still be complicated by the necessity of rethinking the balance of forces remaining in the central region. The CFE definition of WTO countries in Central Europe includes East Germany, Poland, Hungary,

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[103] (...continued)
to that of CFE I. Personal communication with a NATO representative at the current CFE negotiations.

[104] Jonathan C. Randal, "Soviets Agree to Begin Czechoslovakia Pullout", *International Herald Tribune* (hereafter *IHT*), 10-11 February 1990, p. 1.

[105] "Soviets and Hungary Agree on Troop Pullout", *The New York Times*, 11 March 1990, p. 14.

[106] On Walesa's request see the report included in Mark Urban, "'Troops out' Hungary says", *The Independent* (London), 19 January 1990, p. 10.

[107] The border question was recently settled in the Two-plus-Four Talks. See: Robert Mauthner, "Poland wins accord on border issue", *Financial Times*, 18 July 1990, p. 1.

and Czechoslovakia. Thus, potentially 123,000 Soviet troops and associated equipment will be in the process of leaving this area while negotiators are attempting to conclude a CFE agreement. It is difficult to say at present how this concurrent movement of forces will impact on the final outcome of CFE. If a CFE agreement goes ahead on the basis of the Bush proposal for limiting troops in Central Europe to 195,000 these will obviously have to be distributed (albeit temporarily) in either East Germany or Poland. If Soviet troops in Poland are maintained at roughly their current levels, after CFE there will still be approximately 140,000 (down from 380,000) Soviet troops with a negotiated right to stay in the region which is now East Germany.

It is questions related to German reunification, a reunited Germany in NATO, and arrangements for remaining Soviet troops in East Germany that remain critical for the near term. Until recently the Soviet Union was adamant that a reunited Germany could not be a member of NATO, and that Soviet troops would not be prepared to move out of East Germany in the foreseeable future. The Soviet Union obviously did not have a great deal of leverage on this issue, but the leverage it did have, was used skillfully to achieve what is perhaps the best possible outcome under the circumstances. A combination of vague threats, deliberate ambiguity, and domestic chaos perhaps succeeded in achieving for the Soviet Union what no articulate policy could have.

The Kohl-Gorbachev Accord and the NATO Summit

Both the July 1990 NATO Summit in London, and the Kohl-Gorbachev accord on German reunification, addressed virtually every important Soviet concern in this area. The Kohl-Gorbachev accord included: agreement on the signing of a bilateral treaty allowing Soviet troops up to four years to withdraw from East Germany; agreement that there would be no NATO structures in East Germany as long as Soviet troops remained there; reductions in combined German forces to levels of 370,000 troops, to be negotiated in Vienna after a CFE I agreement is concluded; renunciation of the manufacture and possession of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons by a reunited Germany; and the signing of what amounts to a non-aggression pact, in the form a treaty

covering all aspects of relations between Germany and the Soviet Union.[108] The Kohl Government also appears to be prepared to offer the Soviet Union substantial economic aid and guarantees, some of which will be used to lessen the domestic impact of Soviet troops returning home. (Although at the present time the precise nature and extent of these commitments has not been made clear.)

The NATO London declaration also addressed Soviet security concerns by including: a statement on the transformation of the NATO alliance into a more political structure; a non-use of force declaration, and an offer of a non-aggression declaration with all CSCE states; an offer of regular diplomatic liaison between Warsaw Pact countries (including the Soviet Union) and NATO, and an invitation for Gorbachev to address NATO; development of military contacts and exchanges between East and West; agreement in principle to limitations on German forces; a unilateral restructuring of NATO's conventional forces, and reformulation of the concept of forward defence; some indications of a willingness to consider modification of the nuclear doctrine of flexible response, a commitment to use nuclear weapons only as a "last resort", and a reduced importance for sub-strategic nuclear systems; and finally, agreement that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) should have a more prominent place in future security arrangements, with support going to ideas such as a CSCE summit, a CSCE Centre for the Prevention of Conflict, a parliamentary body, review conferences, and the establishment of a small secretariat.[109]

Both the Kohl-Gorbachev accord and the NATO London Declaration went a long way towards addressing Soviet security and economic concerns connected with German reunification. And even though Soviet troops have up to four years to leave the territory

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[108] Serge Schmemann, "Gorbachev Agrees to United Germany In NATO, Kohl Hails 'Breaktrough', Clearing the Way for Merger", *IHT*, 17 July 1990, pp. 1-2; and "Kohl-Gorbachev Accord: 8 Points", *IHT*, 17 July 1990, p.1.; David March, "Kohl signals Soviet non-aggression pact", *Financial Times*, 18 July 1990, p. 1.

[109] "London Declaration On A Transformed North Atlantic Alliance", Press Communique S-1 (90) 36, *NATO Press Service*, London, 6 July 1990.

of East Germany, it seems quite likely that with German economic assistance they will leave in an even shorter period of time. the East German Defence and Disarmament Minister has already warned that anti-Soviet sentiments are growing in the country and a number of confrontations between Soviet troops and local people have occurred.[110]

From this, it can be argued that the enforced withdrawals from Eastern Europe were made easier for the Soviet Union because of its prior acceptance of the principles of reasonable sufficiency, and the earlier establishment of the precedent for unilateral withdrawals in the region. In some sense the Soviet Union had already acknowledged the fact that the presence of Soviet troops in Eastern European countries was no longer entirely legitimate, and that the country was capable of responding unilaterally to this. The December 1988 unilateral initiative was critical in this respect. In addition, the Soviet Union demonstrated that it could rigorously adhere to the principle of political means by rejecting the use of force to reestablish Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe.

The Evolution of Reasonable Sufficiency

With the events in Eastern Europe, and with the increasingly chaotic domestic situation in the Soviet Union, it is possible to identify the beginning of a fourth phase in the development (and perhaps eventual demise) of the concept of reasonable sufficiency. In its development first as a political idea, and later as a military idea, the concept of reasonable sufficiency has become institutionalized as a normal part of the dialogue on security in the Soviet Union. However now because of the fast pace of events in Eastern Europe, and in the Soviet Union itself, the concept may eventually outlive its utility as a dynamic security concept for guiding the international policies of the Soviet Union. One of the most important aspects of the concept of reasonable sufficiency has been the emphasis on developing a type and structure of forces that would not threaten the West, while at the same time providing adequate, or sufficient, defence for the Soviet Union. Yet, in the present context, the issue has shifted almost

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110 "Warning of Strife, East German Aide Urges Soviet Pullout", *IHT*, 6 July 1990, p. 2.

exclusively to the question of adequately defending the Soviet Union itself. It is internal threats to security and stability that are the gravest concern at the present time, and debates on the future of the Soviet armed forces are more likely to focus on requirements determined by domestic economic and political factors, rather than international factors. Rather than addressing the question of the sufficiency of forces to meet the threat from the West, the question now will be what type of armed forces are possible and desirable given the highly unstable and rapidly evolving domestic situation.

IV. CONCLUSION

The discussion in the present paper began with the issue of compromise. However, with respect to conventional arms control policies under Gorbachev, this has involved compromises which have been based on the principle of reasonable sufficiency and the concepts that support this. Decreasing security, increasing economic problems, and a bloated military contributed to the need for a radically different approach to reducing armaments and forces in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This policy, far from being one based on weakness, sought to gain the initiative by stepping out of the mold of negotiated reductions, stalemated at the conventional level for a decade and a half, and into the realm of unilateral actions. As one Soviet analyst has commented: "Let us recall unilateral measures which, if reasonably approached, will amount to an initiative-oriented rather than dilatory policy."[111]

This unilateral approach, fundamentally based on a rejection of the idea of quantitative parity and on an acceptance of the principle of asymmetric responses, has been applied to both arms reductions and to defensive restructuring of the Soviet armed forces. Yet, if it has been unilateral, it has also been a process based on an "engagement" of the West. Through the use of political means such as negotiations, diplomacy, East-West summits, and through constant demands for reciprocity, the Soviet Union has sought to bring the West along with it, in a build-down of military force in

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[111] Andrei Kozyrev, "Confidence And The Balance Of Interests", *International Affairs* (Moscow), November 1988, p. 10.

Europe. The CFE negotiations have played an important function in legitimizing (and eventually verifying) the asymmetrical reduction of the Soviet preponderance of force in Europe.

But, given the recent events in Eastern Europe, the likely completion of a CFE agreement, the trend towards unilateral action by the Soviet Union, and similar budgetary (and demographic) pressures in the West, one must wonder about the future of conventional arms control negotiations in Europe. These factors, and the increasing complexity of conventional arms control, may signal an end to the relevancy, feasibility, or desirability of further negotiated reductions in Europe. The exception to this may be the requirement to negotiate, or institutionalize in some form or another, the deep reduction of both German and foreign troops in a reunited Germany.

Finally, there is one last paradox contained in Gorbachev's compromises based on principle. Until now, Gorbachev has carried out a policy of arms reduction in which a lessened military potential has ironically proven to be a source of increased international influence, and perhaps even power. As one Soviet proponent of the concept of reasonable sufficiency stated, "the ability of a state to limit its military potential and take account of the partner's interests in its policy can, paradoxically, become a factor of power today."[112] Whether this will continue to be the case in the face of the Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe remains the challenge for Soviet arms reduction policies in the immediately foreseeable future.

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[112] Igor Malashenko, "New rules of international behaviour", *New Times*, 17-23 October 1989, (42), p. 18.